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Abstract 
On December 2nd 2009, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
announced its intention to oppose the acquisition of Mobil’s retail assets by Caltex, based 
in part on an assessment of adverse competition effects in some local markets.  Their 
assessment was based upon the proportion of sites within each local market that would 
become controlled by Caltex post-merger.  This paper suggests an alternative method for 
analysing competitive effects, which formalises local market structure into a network and 




The ACCC’s Caltex-Mobil Decision: A Network View 
Introduction 
On December 2nd, the ACCC announced its intention to oppose the acquisition of Mobil’s 
retail network by Caltex, based at least in part on its considerations concerning 
competitive effects in local markets.  The ACCC deem d such effects likely if the post-
merger share of Caltex-controlled outlets in the loca  market around each Mobil outlet 
was greater than one half, and possible if it was greater than 40 percent.  
 
We suggest a different approach to assessing competitive ffects, based upon 
representing market structure via a network, and looking at the position of each outlet in 
that network.  We compare the ACCC’s approach with ours in a case study of the Perth 
market which, although not part of the ACCC’s investigation, contains excellent data.1   
 
Section Two of this paper outlines the ACCC decision in more detail.  Section Three 
provides some background to the Perth market.  Section Four shows how a network 
summarising competition can be constructed and provides an overview of the measures 
which one can use to highlight structural advantage in that network.  Section Five 
compares our methodology with the ACCC’s in the Perth retail petroleum market.  
Section Six concludes. 
                                                
1 Our approach could be easily replicated for any of the cities which the ACCC does analyse by someone 
with the Informed Sources datasets that the ACCC used in its analysis.  We do not have access to this data, 
so instead use the more readily available Fu lWatch data from Perth. 
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The ACCC Decision 
On December 2nd 2009. the ACCC released a statement outlining its intention to oppose 
the acquisition of Mobil’s retail assets by Caltex.2  The proposed takeover eventuated 
following a corporate decision by Mobil to divest much of its downstream business in 
Australia, part of which involved selling its roughly 300 retail outlets.  It still intends to 
undertake this divestment, although it will not now seek to sell its retail outlets to Caltex. 
 
The ACCC’s investigation found that the acquisition of 53 by Caltex would be likely to 
have the effect of substantially reducing competition in the relevant local markets.  The 
sites were in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelai ; the cities where it focussed its 
analysis.  The ACCC was also concerned that the takeover would exacerbate co-
ordination in retail petroleum markets, most particularly because Caltex is frequently a 
price leader when prices cycle upwards, and Mobil has, on average, lower prices than 
Caltex.  In its press release, the ACCC expressed a preference that the retail outlets be 
taken over by a ‘maverick’ or aggressive discounter mo e likely to inject competition into 
the marketplace. 
 
In undertaking its analysis, the ACCC looked at overall price levels in each of the cities 
analysed, determining which brands had the lowest prices.  It also examined local market 
effects.  It defined a local market as all the outlets within five kilometres of the outlet 
being analysed.  It looked at idiosyncratic features of each local market, such as local 
geography and the number and nature of independent op rators in each market, but its 
                                                
2 Available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/904296, which also contains links to the 
various background papers underpinning the ACCC’s decision. 
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main focus was the number of outlets controlled by Caltex before and after the merger.  
Post merger, if this proportion was greater than 50 percent, the ACCC suggested this 
would be likely to result in competition concerns i that local marketplace, whilst for 
proportions between 40 and 50 percent it suggested that the takeover may raise 
competition concerns.  It was on the basis of this assessment that the ACCC made its 
decision. 
 
Perth was not included in the ACCC’s decision.  However, it has excellent data which we 
have used (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010a, b, c, d) to explore market structure and its 
effects on pricing.  Thus, in this paper, we compare and contrast the ACCC’s 
methodology with our own.  Before doing so, we describe the Perth market and our 
methodology for determining market structure in more detail. 
Background to the Perth Market 
Retail petroleum outlets in Western Australia are governed the FuelWatch scheme 
whereby each outlet must advise the regulator (who publicises that price) of its next-day 
price and keep that price for 24 hours.  The regime is described in detail in ACCC (2007) 
and the controversies surrounding analysis of its impacts in Davidson (2008). 
 
The data used in this study cover the period from January 1st 2003 to March 14th 2004.  
The start-date is chosen as data on wholesale or terminal gate prices (the proxy for the 
marginal cost of retailers) are unavailable before this date, and the end-date is chosen 
because the following day marked the conversion of some 40 Shell outlets into Coles 
Express outlets through a joint venture between Coles and Shell.  The data do not cover 
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all outlets in Perth, omitting some on the outskirt of the city, those for which the data 
series are incomplete (usually because they are new, or ere closed for long periods 
during the sample period owing to a change in ownership) and those for which the 
retailing of fuel is not a core business (such as taxi depots and marinas).  Data on demand 
come from the ABS Census (ABS, 2006) whilst the remaining data come from 
FuelWatch, or are based on data in the FuelWatch database.3 
 
Table One provides information on branding, ownership tructures, presence of 
convenience stores and location of competitors. 
 
Table One: Perth market summary 
Branding Competitors Within 
5km 
Distance to Nearest 
Competitor 











BP 52 16 Branded Independent 23 up to 2 10 up to 0.4 38 
Caltex  57 29 Company Controlled 99 3 or 4 16 0.41 to 0.8 38 
Woolworths 4   Distributor Controlled 2 5 or 6 31 0.81 to 1.2 41 
Gull 27   Independent 2 7 or 8 35 1.21 to 1.6 35 
Independent 2   Larger Independent 37 9 or 10 43 1.61 to 2 39 
Liberty 5   Price Supported 42 11 or 12 37 2.01 to 2.4 8 
Mobil 13 11 Supermarket 4 13 or 14 13 2.41 to 2.8 5 
Peak 13   15 or 16 17 2.81 to 3.2 2 
Shell 35 8 > 16 7 > 3.2 3 
Wesco 1   
  
    
 
Caltex has the largest market share, followed by BP and Shell.  Independent chains (Gull, 
Liberty and Peak) make up roughly a quarter of the sample, making them collectively 
more important than either Shell or Mobil and slightly smaller than BP.  Supermarkets 
                                                
3 The authors would like to thank the FuelWatch regulator for making this dataset available. 
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are more prevalent today than in the dataset, which precedes the entry of Coles, and is 
from a time when only small numbers of Woolworths outlets existed.  Today, the two 
comprise almost half of overall Fuel sales in Australia (ACCC, 2007). 
 
Company controlled outlets comprise roughly half of those in Table Two, according to 
FuelWatch, which defines outlets owned directly by the Majors and outlets owned by 
their multi-site franchisees as being company controlled.  In WA as a whole, Shell owns 
eight sites, BP owns five and Mobil none.  Thus, most of the outlets listed as company 
controlled in Table One are owned by one of the multi-site franchisees of these brands.  
Caltex has no multi-site franchises due to the terms of its 1995 merger with Ampol (see 
Walker & Woodward, 1996).  Instead, it uses single sit franchises and a price-support 
scheme described in detail in Wang (2009). 
 
Convenience stores attached to retail petroleum outlets are often an important source of 
profits for the brands which own them.  Caltex has two convenience store brands, whilst 
Shell, Mobil and BP have one apiece.  Most Mobil out ets have a convenience store 
attached, as do around two-thirds of Caltex outlets.  The shares for BP and Shell are each 
less than one-third.  None of the independent brands has a convenience store brand, 
though some (Gull in particular) sell convenience store items in many of its outlets. 
 
Although Perth is a relatively low-density city, retail petroleum outlets tend to be located 
along highways or at the major shopping centres which exist in some suburbs.  This is in 
part due to zoning laws and in part due to a desire to be located at nodes of demand.  For 
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this reason, distances to the nearest rival tends to be low (on average just over one km) 
and the number of competitors within five kilometres is nine.  
The Perth Market as a Network 
An important aspect of this paper is the way in which we model market structure.  Rather 
than use indirect measure such as seller density or the penetration of independents, we 
develop a simple theoretical model of bilateral interaction and use this to test who 
competes with whom.  We collect these bilateral links to form a network which 
summarises the structure of competition in the marketplaces as a whole and use simple 
graph-cutting tools to delineate local sub-markets.  We then use a number of measures of 
network structure from the mathematical sociology literature to summarise the position of 
each retail gasoline outlet in the overall structure of the global market and local sub-
markets.  We describe the process of network formation nd division briefly below, and 
in more detail in Bloch and Wills-Johnson (2010c). 
 
The simple theoretical model is based upon that of Hoover (1937) and MacBride (1983), 
who study how spatial differentiation can give rise to local market power.  Our point of 
departure is an assumption that consumers come to th  re ailer rather than having goods 
delivered to them, and this requires the retailer to set a single price for all consumers 
without knowing from whence each has come. 
 
In a duopoly where each firm sells one unit of an homogenous good to an homogenous 
set of consumers whose travel plans take them past one retail petroleum outlet during but 
who must deviate to frequent the other (meaning purchase from the former is costless but 
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that from the latter is not), each firm has two choi es; set a higher price than its rival and 
collect rents from those customers for whom deviation o its rival is more costly or set a 
price lower than its rival and endeavour to steal mrket share.  The advantages of each 
choice change depending upon overall price levels, and it is relatively simple to show the 
situations whereby this will give rise to an Edgeworth Cycle (see Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 
2010a).  It is also relatively simple to show that the minima of such price cycles will be 
related in a consistent fashion if firms compete (ibid).  Moreover, if marginal costs and 
the proportion passing each outlet first are equal, one can easily show that the minimum 
of each price cycle for each outlet in the duopoly will be the same (see Bloch & Wills-
Johnson, 2010c, for an illustration of these results). 
 
This gives rise to a simple test of connection.  Wefirst form the series of price cycle 
minima for each gasoline station by taking the lowest price in the three days prior to each 
price increase of greater than five percent.4  We then undertake a simple statistical test of 
the difference between the means for each pair of outlets within five kilometres of one 
another.5  Where there is no statistically significant difference between the means, we 
deem the two outlets to be connected.  By collecting these connected pairs, we are able to 
construct a network which summarises the patterns of connection in the overall market. 
 
                                                
4 Looking four days prior and using different price ncreases made little difference to results; the increasing 
phase of each price cycle is quite clear in the data. 
5 The ACCC adopted this local market definition in a recent merger decision (see 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/904296), and a similar distance has been used to define 
local markets in the US literature (see Hastings, 2004 or USSPSICGA, 2002).  We use it as a provisional 
measure of local markets, to avoid having to test every possible bilateral pair in a collection of 208 gasoline 
stations. 
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We then divide this network in to a series of submarkets, using an approach pioneered by 
Gould (1967), and subsequently widely used in geography (see, for example, Cliff, 
Haggett & Ord, 1979, Boots, 1985, O’hUallachain, 1985 and Straffin, 1980).   
 
The network is first converted into an adjacency matrix; a symmetric, zero-one matrix 
where a zero in the ijth position indicates that nodes i and j are not connected, and a one 
indicates that they are.  We then take the eigenvectors of this adjacency matrix.  The first 
(that is, the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue) has all positive entries.  In 
order to be orthogonal to the first, the remaining eigenvectors must contain positive and 
negative elements.  Gould (1967) suggests that clusters of positive and negative 
eigenvector elements indicate sub-groups within the network.  The approach is somewhat 
judgemental, but subsequent testing of the submarkets (s e Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 
2010c) suggests they are reasonably robust, and indeed give a better characterisation of 
groups of like-priced outlets than branding does. 
 
The results of following Gould’s (1967) approach using the second to sixth eigenvectors 
(after which the signal to noise ratio makes it impossible to uncover further structure) 
divides the market into eight distinct sub-markets.  Figure One, overleaf, shows the 
overall market with the eight sub-markets superimposed.  The dark-grey area represents 
the Swan River, which divides the city North from South, and the light grey line 
represents the main north-south freeway, which divides East from West.  Placement of 
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each station is approximate, but roughly correlates to the physical shape of the Perth 
market.6  The different shaded dots represent different brands.   
                                                
6 The software used to construct the networks and calculate their structural characteristics (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002) has only limited capabilities in terms of spatial mapping. 
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Having constructed the network and divided it up into sub-markets, one can then 
calculate a number of summary statistics for the network as a whole and for each sub-
market in isolation.  Of particular use are Burt’s (1992) measures of redundancy, 
efficiency and constraint, which he uses to capture the notion of a structural hole; a part 
of the network where there are few connections betwe n densely intra-connected sub-
groups.  Burt’s (1992) measures have been widely used in the literature, and Burt (2000, 
2002, 2005) contain reviews of empirical applications of his measures. 
 
What Burt (1992) terms the redundant portion of onenode’s relationship with another 
node is the extent to which their relationship is through other nodes connected to both of 
them; the more indirect connections the two nodes have, the more redundant are these 
connections, as there are many paths down which information can flow.  The effective 
size of the network for a given node is the sum of the non-redundant portions of its 
relationships with all other nodes in the network, and ranges from one to N, the total 
number of nodes in the network.  The efficiency of the network for a given node is its 
effective size divided by N.  A more efficient network is one where structural ho es are 
better situated from the perspective of the node for which efficiency is being calculated. 
 
 Constraint is the absence of structural holes, meaning that, even if a node severs its direct 
connection with another node, indirect connections mean that it is still restricted by that 
node.  Burt (1992) defines constraint as the sum of the proportion of network time spent 
on connections with a given node and across all other nodes which that node and the node 
for which constraint is being calculated are connected to.   
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We make use here of Burt’s (1992) measures of effici ncy and constraint.  Elsewhere 
(Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010d) we regress these measures, along with a number of 
other independent variables, against price, using Hansen’s (1996, 1999, 2000) Threshold 
Regression Model to differentiate between effects which dominate in the upwards phase 
of the price cycle and those which dominate in the downwards phase.   
 
We find that global constraint (that is, Burt’s constraint score for each node in the 
network as a whole) has a negative coefficient during the downswing of the cycle, 
indicating that those outlets which are the bridges b tween sub-markets and are hence 
least constrained also exhibit the highest prices.  Potentially, they are acting to slow the 
flow of price information between sub-markets.  We also find that local efficiency and 
constraint (that is, within each sub-market) have a positive coefficient during the 
downswing.7  The former is consistent with the negative global constraint results, and 
suggests that those outlets for which the relevant local market is favourable are able to 
leverage their superior structural position into higher prices.  The latter, however, does 
not fit this same picture.  We suspect that what is happening is that the peripheral outlets 
with access to customers outside the network in Figure One, pay less attention to the 
pricing of their peers in each local market and concentrate instead upon reaping 
monopoly profits from these external customers for which they face limited competition.8 
 
                                                
7 None of the market structure effects are significant during the upswing, confirming Wang’s (2009) 
suspicion that it is only in the downswing that local market competitive effects are important. 
8 Eckert & West (2005) show that outlets on the peripheries of cities in Canada were less likely to close 
during the 1990s, pointing to similar effects as noted here. 
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From the perspective of an assessment of local market competition, therefore, we can 
now make a number of suggestions.  The first is that the ACCC should look closely at 
globally unconstrained outlets, which sit at the bridges between sub-markets.  If one 
player can capture many of these in a given market, it may be able to restrict the flow of 
price information between sub-markets, even without owning a majority of outlets in any 
sub-market.  The second is that the ACCC should also look at the acquisition of outlets 
with high local efficiency scores, as possession of sufficient of these in a given local 
market may provide the relevant owner with sufficient l verage to extract rents from that 
sub-market without owning a majority of outlets within it.  The third is that the ACCC 
should show less concern for the acquisition of outlets on the market fringe.  These are 
likely to have high prices regardless of their ownership and thus, even if an acquisition of 
them results in a local market share of greater than one-half, overall competition within 
that local market is unlikely to be affected much. 
 
Using these lessons, we now compare and contrast an application of the ACCC’s 
methodology in Perth’s retail petroleum market with an assessment based upon constraint 
and efficiency. 
Comparing the Network Approach with the ACCC’s Appr oach 
In Figure One, there are 13 Mobil outlets.9   If we define a local market in the same way 
that the ACCC does (all outlets within five kilometres of the relevant Mobil outlet) and 
examine the post-acquisition share of Caltex in each lo al market, then there are few 
competition concerns likely to arise.  In only one case (Outlet 69) would the ACCC’s 
                                                
9 There are actually more Mobil stations in Perth, but only these 13 were considered in the analysis of 
Bloch & Wills-Johnson (2010b, c, d).  Others were on the periphery of the city, or contained insufficient 
data to undertake econometric analysis. 
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threshold of 50 percent be breached and in only three further cases (Outlets 99, 146 and 
147 – with the latter two being essentially the same market) would its threshold of 40 
percent be breached.  Elsewhere, the ACCC’s approach suggests no competition 
concerns. 
 
However, Figure One casts a somewhat different lighon these findings.  Turning first to 
global constraint, Outlets 91, 199, 99, 69 and 179 all lie in the lower quartile of global 
constraint results.  This suggests they may be able to use their position vis-a-vis the 
market as a whole to strategically control the flow f information between sub-markets.  
For example, Outlet 91 appears to be one of the conduits for pricing information between 
the North and South of the Swan River.  Its owner may thus have scope to restrict the 
flow of pricing information from South to North.  Moreover, post-merger, Caltex would 
control more than a third of these lower-quartile outlets; as much as BP and Shell 
Combined.  There may thus be wisdom in excising these outlets from the sale, and 
requiring that the they be purchased by independents, who might have less interest in 
controlling the flow of pricing information between sub-markets. 
 
As noted above, local constraint is not an issue, bt local efficiency is.  To explore this 
further, we calculate the local efficiency scores for each of the outlets in the 13 local 
markets created by following the ACCC’s market definition, and allowing every outlet 
within five kilometres to be connected.10  The results are shown in Table Two, where 
existing Mobil outlets are highlighted light-grey, and Caltex are coloured dark-gray. 
                                                
10 The result is local markets which are a little more densely connected than a radius of five kilometres 
around each Mobil outlet in Figure One would suggest. 
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Table Two: Local efficiency in the ACCC’s markets 

























15 1 40 0.625 48 0.388 52 0.625 204 1 241 0.556 
16 0.592 42 0.556 51 0.388 54 0.625 201 0.52 242 0.556 
12 0.5 39 0.5 52 0.36 55 0.556 200 0.25 235 0.5 
14 0.469 37 0.375 53 0.333 48 0.5 202 0.25 243 0.5 
17 0.44 41 0.375 44 0.278 53 0.5 203 0.25 238 0.25 
118 0.44 35 0.333 45 0.278 58 0.5 205 0.25 239 0.25 
18 0.389 38 0.333 43 0.2 51 0.36 240 0.25 
119 0.375 43 0.333 46 0.2 44 0.25 
19 0.28 61 0.333 45 0.25 
20 0.28        





























69 0.44 91 0.511 97 0.5 146 0.528 147 0.521 179 0.361 199 8.857 
67 0.407 97 0.5 102 0.396 147 0.48 146 0.48 183 0.361 198 5.6 
68 0.407 104 0.5 21 0.389 145 0.333 111 0.375 184 0.322 188 4.111 
83 0.36 90 0.449 99 0.385 111 0.313 145 0.333 185 0.292 194 2.75 
86 0.36 92 0.404 100 0.375 109 0.281 109 0.265 214 0.273 195 2.714 
71 0.313 89 0.347 98 0.372 148 0.281 110 0.265 188 0.256 197 2.333 
81 0.28 102 0.347 16 0.333 149 0.281 112 0.25 178 0.25 214 2.333 
72 0.265 103 0.333 22 0.278 151 0.25 142 0.2 180 0.25 189 2.143 
73 0.265 73 0.309 92 0.24 142 0.2 143 0.2 186 0.22 190 2.143 
74 0.265 98 0.309 103 0.24 143 0.2 144 0.2 187 0.188 200 1.8 
64 0.25 96 0.306 94 0.16 144 0.2 148 0.167 182 0.185 196 1.4 
87 0.281 95 0.16 110 0.184 149 0.167 181 0.156 181 1 
86 0.265 96 0.16 108 0.167 189 0.156 182 1 
82 0.25 91 0.156 190 0.156 201 1 
84 0.224 90 0.136 202 1 
94 0.18 
95 0.18 
 99 0.16      
 
 
We do not present any definitive demarcation points, such as possessing more than half 
the total efficiency, as this would be arbitrary, much as the ACCC’s benchmark of half 
the market share is.  However, in the case of the markets around outlets 14, 203 and 199, 
there would appear to be few concerns, as Caltex is not acquiring any of the outlets with 
the top three efficiency scores.  The markets around outlets 242 and 179 are also unlikely 
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to pose much concern as, even though Caltex is acquiring outlets with high efficiency 
scores, there is not much difference between the larg st and smallest scores.  The same 
might be said of Outlet 91.  For the remainder, however, Caltex is acquiring the most or 
(often and) the second most efficient outlet.  In particular, in the case of Outlet 199, it is 
much more efficient that others in its local market, and thus its acquisition may raise 
concerns, even though Caltex would only have two outlets in that market. 
Conclusions 
In its recent decision on the proposed takeover of Mobil’s retail sites around Australia by 
Caltex, the ACCC paid particular attention to the local market effects, examining whether 
the takeover would put Caltex in a position of having a greater than 50 percent market 
share in any local market.  This is appropriate if all outlets in a given local market are 
equal.  However, clearly they are not.  The ACCC endeavoured to account for this in a 
rather ad-hoc fashion by considering idiosyncrasies of each local market, such as the 
presence or absence of independents or particular geographic features (main roads, for 
example) which might influence competition. 
 
Here, we present an alterative approach to account f r the inequalities between outlets by 
modelling market structure more directly through the use of networks, and considering 
market power to be related to positioning that network.  We establish the link between 
network position and higher prices in a separate paper (Bloch & Wills-Johnson, 2010d) 
and use those findings here to give policy recommendations.   
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We compare and contrast our methodology with the ACCC’s own approach, using the 
retail petroleum market in Perth as a case study.  It allows us to highlight two salient 
points.  The first of these is that, were the Perth Mobil outlets included in the ACCC’s 
assessment, it methods would have missed a number of k y utlets which sit at junction 
points between sub-markets and are thus potentially ab e to restrict the flow of price 
information between those sub-markets.  The second is that, at the level of each local 
market, one can uncover elements of local market power deriving from the structure of 
the relevant local market which are missed by the ACCC’s approach.   
 
The methodology presented here does not aim to present an infallible or complete picture 
of market dynamics.  However, it does provide a wayof capturing market structure in a 
formal manner, and bringing this information to bear in market power and merger 
analyses.  Although we use a retail petroleum market as a case study here, the 
methodology has wide application whenever markets have a spatial nature.   
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